Secular Authority: Economists in Irish Public Discourse by FitzGerald, Joseph K. & O\u27Rourke, Brendan
Technological University Dublin 
ARROW@TU Dublin 
Conference papers School of Marketing 
2018 
Secular Authority: Economists in Irish Public Discourse 
Joseph K. FitzGerald 
Technological University Dublin, josephkfitzgerald@gmail.com 
Brendan O'Rourke 
Technological University Dublin, brendan.orourke@tudublin.ie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/buschmarcon 
 Part of the Business Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fitzgerald, J. & O'Rourke, B. (2018). Secular authority: economists in Irish public discourse. Society for the 
Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE) 30th Annual Conference Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, 
June 23-25. doi.org/10.21427/nkts-a641 
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and 
open access by the School of Marketing at ARROW@TU 
Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Conference 
papers by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU 
Dublin. For more information, please contact 
yvonne.desmond@tudublin.ie, arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, 
brian.widdis@tudublin.ie. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License 
Please note this is a working paper and corrections and general feedback is most appreciated by the authors Page 1 
 
Conference paper for the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics 30th Annual 
Conference, Doshisha University,  Kyoto, Japan,  June 23-25, 2018. 
Secular Authority: Economists in Irish Public Discourse  
Joseph K. Fitzgerald 
(josephkfitzgerald@gmail.com) 
& 
Dr. Brendan K. O’Rourke 
(brendan.orourke@dit.ie) 
College of Business, 
Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland 
 
Joseph K. Fitzgerald lectures in Research Methods and International Business, and a PhD 
candidate at Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT), Ireland. His research looks at the 
discourses of economics experts during media interactions, and how economists attain and 
maintain legitimacy.   
 
Dr. Brendan K. O’Rourke is currently director of the Business, Society and Sustainability 
DIT research centre and is also the co-founder of DIT’s Discourse Analysis Group (DAG).  
Both in his lecturing and research at DIT, he focuses on learning in the area of discourses of 
the economy, in particular, examining discourses of enterprise, strategy and economists’ 
communication with non-experts.  
 
Abstract 
This paper explores how the authority of Economics Experts has developed over time in 
Ireland. The identity of ‘expert’ serves as a powerful authority device for an individual’s 
discourse (Montgomery 2008). Although the definition of who is considered an expert has 
become broader and more inclusive (Collins and Evans 2007), the authority derived from the 
label of expert is usually reserved for Contributory Experts (Collins, Evans, and Weinel 
2016). This authority has traditionally allowed such experts to engage with society from a 
position of authority and prestige that is not afforded to other societal actors. Such authority 
has been acknowledged of economists, whose discourse appears to have an assumed 
legitimacy (Maesse 2015). Theoretically, this research draws from a number of areas 
including work on the identity of experts in general (Montgomery, 2008) on economics 
experts in particular (Maesse, 2015), professionalization both generally (Macdonald, 1995) 
and of economics in particular (Fourcade, 2009). The Irish context is of interest more 
generally it was a prominent crisis, yet speedily recovering country in the Eurozone crisis, is 
a small peripheral state and is a site of confluence between Anglo-American and European 
influences. Its close relationships with both the UK and the United States are particular 
interesting for an examination of the relationships between national and international 
influences on economists in a society. 
 
 




This research seeks to explain, by looking at the longer term development of the economics 
profession in Ireland, the enduring nature of prominence of economics in public discourse in 
Ireland.  We open with a look at some of the theoretical researches we use to interpret the 
Irish profession’s development. We then use those resources to examine in turn Irish 
economics and the various Orders, particularly the Academic and Political Orders, 
involvement in the development of   Irish economics. Sources of information used in these 
sections on the development of the Irish profession include contemporary works by 
economists, historical scholar of the various periods involved and interviews with a number 
of Irish economists carried for the purposes of this research. We finish with a short 
conclusions and discussions section.  
  2. Theoretical Understandings of Economics Expertise in Society 
 
Theoretically, this research draws from a number of areas including work on the identity of 
experts in general (Collins and Evans, 2007; Montgomery, 2008) and economics experts in 
particular (Maesse, 2015), professionalization both generally (Macdonald, 1995) and of 
economics (Fourcade, 2009; Lebaron, 2001; Mirowski, 1991). 
   
This theoretical framework will facilitate an investigation if how the economics profession has 
established itself as the expert on the economy, and the nature of this expertise. It will do this 
through an exploration of the four ‘Orders’ (‘Worlds’ in Maesse, 2015) that are outlined as 
‘Academic Order’, ‘Media Order’, ‘Business Order’, and ‘Political Order’. Although these 
Orders are distinct, they are highly interconnected, with economists able to use the capital 
accrued in one Order to support discourse in another Order. The ‘Academic Order’ focusses 
on the formalising of economics with academia, and the symbolic capital that the profession 
has accrued from this. Economics is an academically organised form of knowledge, and thus 
an understanding of how the academic system of economics is structured is necessary to 
understand the knowledge production within economics (Fourcade, 2009). The ‘Political 
Order’ will focus on the relationship between economics and politics, and how economics has 
become incorporated into policy making and policy advice. This framework outlines the 
importance of academic capital to this incorporation, and how the political Order uses 
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economists. The ‘Business Order’ focusses on the how the development of the profession has 
been shaped by its relationship with business. The ‘Media Order’ focusses on how the 
profession can use its accrued capital from the other Orders to support its discourse through 





Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
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 3. Economics and the Academic Order, particularized to Ireland. 
 3.1 The development of economics in Ireland as part of the United Kingdom 
 
Economics began to be seen as distinct when it attained a new level of formality in the 
generalist learned societies of the mid-eighteenth century (Augello and Guidi 2001:6). At that 
time, the public perception of political economy was that, although it was thought to be 
important for understanding the world, it was not considered specialist knowledge in the vein 
of medicine or the law (Tribe 2001:36). This was also the position held within academia 
(Fourcade 2009:237), which, at that time, had yet to formalise the study of most social sciences. 
The generalist societies, important venues for early political economists, were held in high 
esteem, and recognised them as ‘an important tool for economic progress, above all through 
the dissemination of knowledge and encouragement of innovations’ (Augello and Guidi 
2001:7). In Ireland, there were two early generalist societies. The first was The Dublin Society 
for Improving Husbandry, Manufactures, and other Useful Arts in 1731 (Augello and Guidi 
2001:6), which would later be known as the Royal Dublin Society (RDS), and the second was 
the Royal Irish Academy (RIA) in 1785 (O ’Conor 1949).  
 
More dedicated economics societies began to emerge internationally in the nineteenth century 
(Augello and Guidi 2001:1). The first societies that explicitly considered political economy as 
a stated focus, tasked themselves with spreading the tenets of economic policy that the likes of 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo had expounded (Augello and Guidi 2001:8). Amongst the 
earliest of these societies internationally was the Political Economy Club (PEC), founded in 
London in 1821 (Tribe 2001:32), and whose membership was restricted to the British elites 
(Fourcade 2009:238). Although the Paris Societe d’Economie Politique would go on to become 
the most influential society for subsequent societies across Europe (Augello and Guidi 2001:8), 
the PEC would serve as a greater influence in Ireland, due to Ireland forming part of the UK at 
that time. Amongst the early members of the PEC were the Whately Professor at Trinity 
College Dublin, and Professors in Political Economy at Queen’s Colleges of Ireland, which 
were located in Belfast, Cork, and Galway (Fonseca n.d.). In these formative years, the PEC 
had a general membership that was dominated by the elite class, such as politicians and 
businessmen. Given that academic institutionalisation of the discipline was still in its infancy 
when the PEC was founded, the economics training of many of its members was informal at 
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best (Tribe 2001:33). Although membership was exclusionary, it was exclusionary based on 
social class rather than on academic credentials (Fourcade 2009:238).  
 
In 1831, the British Association for the Advancement of Science would provide a more 
dedicated venue for scientific discussion for statistics in 1833, and for political economy in 
1856, both of which would facilitate ‘a more public forum for the discussion of practical and 
theoretical issues connected with political economy’ (Tribe 2001:33). Parallels in Ireland to the 
formalised political economy position within the British Association were seen in the Statistical 
and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland (SSISI), founded in 1847, and soon established itself as 
a prominent society in Ireland. Although it held a purview broader than political economy, this 
discipline would be a core focus of SSISI from its establishment. SSISI’s Barrington lectures 
gave a formalised presence to political economy (Besomi 2008:331) and the details of the 
lectures governance were testament to the dissemination of an economic discourse that was 
embedded not in morality but in a political, technical, and practical nature (Augello and Guidi 
2001:7; Tribe, 2001:38). These earlier developments were drawing more on the Business 
Order, than the academic one.  
 
In Ireland, the academic institutionalisation of political economy can be traced back to Trinity 
College Dublin (TCD), and its establishing of the Whately Chair (Tail, 1982). TCD was 
originally established in 1592, and the mid-19th century the  only university in Dublin (Walsh 
2014). Chairs in political economy began to emerge in the 1820s, with the Drummond Chair 
of Political Economy at Oxford, established in 1826, being amongst the earliest and most 
prominent (Oslington 2001:825). The Chair of political economy at TCD was established by 
Richard Whately, who arrived in Dublin in 1832 after being appointed as Archbishop of 
Dublin. Whately  developed his interest and knowledge of political economy during his 
occupation of the Drummond Chair in Oxford, which he held immediately prior to arriving in 
Dublin (Tail 1982:16). The Whately Chair of Political Economy was initially met by opposition 
within TCD (Rashid 1977:153), given the general ignorance there was of the discipline and a 
belief that political economy was intrinsically linked to party politics, which the TCD hierarchy 
would not view as having a place in academia (Boylan and Foley 1992:24). Also, it was 
perceived that political economy was a practical subject, which was inferior to the elite subjects 
suitable for universities (Fourcade 2009:236). Although Whately  determination proved  
successful (Black, 1945) in getting the Chair in Political Economy established, the chair did 
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have certain limitations, which were in keeping with other political economy chairs of the day 
(Murphy, 1983). The Whately Chair originally had a five-year tenure, adopted from Oxford’s 
Drummond Chair, rather than permanency (Tail 1982:17), and the Whately Chair occupant 
was required to give a number of public lectures each year (Black 1945:140). Therefore, despite 
receiving academic formalisation, political economy was not recognised as an equal with other 
academic disciplines. Rather, it was seen as an extension class that a student could take, a 
position that seemed to confirm the inferiority of political economy at the time (Fourcade 
2009:236).     
 
The eligibility requirements for prospective occupants of the Whately Chair were naturally 
exclusionary. To be considered, an individual would need at least a Master of Arts 
qualification, or a Bachelor in Civil Law, and initially it was open to graduates from TCD, 
Cambridge, and Oxford only, although graduates of the Queen’s Colleges, established in 1845 
and located in Belfast, Cork, and Galway, were later also granted eligibility (Boylan and Foley 
1992:23–25). This restrictive eligibility criteria served to maintain the restrictive nature of the 
discipline that had been established in the societies. Indicative of the early occupants of the 
Whately Chair was its first occupant, Mountifort Longfield (Black 1947:69). Longfield was 
born into the landed gentry class, and like many of his peers, he went to TCD where he took 
his degree in science (Tail 1982:15), before going on to study law. This legal background would 
be indicative of many of the early occupants of the Whately chair, and would be influential on 
their political economy work (Black 1947:73). The selection of Longfield was a somewhat 
contested affair. The Provost of TCD at the time argued that a person should be selected ‘who 
would be of sound and safe conservative views’ (Tail 1982:17). This was at odds with Whately, 
who was a liberal. Longfield considered himself a Tory, but he was the least dogmatic Tory 
available of the potential nominees (Tail 1982:18). Longfield is acknowledged as perhaps the 
most significant figure in the establishment of economic science in Ireland (Black 1945:141), 
evidenced by the fact that his Lectures on Political Economy remained a prescribed reading for 
students of political economy until 1872, and his founding of SSISI, along with two subsequent 
Whately Chair occupants - William Hancock and James Lawson. His work appeared to draw 
heavily from Nassau Senior, the original occupant of the Drummond Chair in Oxford (Moss 
2011:111–12).  
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The academic formalisation of political economy at TCD by Richard Whately and the 
subsequent formation of SSISI by early Whately Chair occupants were instrumental in this 
early professionalisation of economics in Ireland. However, another core element required for 
professionalisation, a dedicated scientific journal to ensure requisite standards of scientific 
quality, would not come until the end of the 1800s. The Economic Journal, initially published 
in 1891 by the British Economic Association, which would become the Royal Economic 
Society (RES) in 1902, was the first dedicated economics journal in the UK (Tribe 2001:32). 
This journal would soon become the authoritative publication for political economy in Ireland. 
Charles Bastable, Whately Chair occupant between 1882-1932 (it was Bastable who removed 
the five-year tenure), who published regularly in the Economic Journal, and was also an 
original member of the RES (Smith et al. 1945:127). Given that Ireland was part of the UK at 
this time, the Economic Journal would have served as the national journal for prominent Irish 
political economists during this period.  
 
Despite serving as a national journal, the Economic Journal lacked a focus on Ireland and Irish 
issues. This absence would be filled by a generalist academic journal called Studies: An Irish 
Quarterly Review, which covered social, cultural, political, and economic issues in Ireland and 
was founded by the Jesuits. The arrival of Studies in the early 1900s, and the University 
College, Dublin (UCD) in 1908, would see a divergence within economics in Ireland. The era 
of the complete dominance of British institutions on Irish economics was coming to an end by 
the turn of the century, as the challenge from nationalist institutions began to grow. 
 
This early phase of professionalisation of economics in Ireland followed a somewhat typical,  
trajectory. Firstly, academic formalisation was achieved through the Whately Chair in TCD. 
Secondly, the formation of professional bodies or societies was facilitated through SSISI, as a 
de facto professional body for the discipline in Ireland, along with the London-based PEC. 
Thirdly, professional journals emerged in the guise of the Economic Journal, which for as at 
least as long as Ireland was part of the UK was regarded as ‘national’ institution for the 
economics profession in Ireland at the time. As Irish nationalism gained strength the more 
generalist Irish journal, Studies, provided a national publication outlet for economists, as 
evidenced by the publications by George O’Brien, Chair of National Economics in UCD, 
throughout the 1900s.  
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The profession was established in the elite societies of the 1700s and formalised in the elite 
Irish academic institutes in the 1800s. However, despite this elite characteristic, the profession 
did not attain a prestigious position within academia during this period. Instead, it was viewed 
as a practical discipline, which was more suited for popular consumption then academic 
respect.  Further complicating the formalising of economics was the political situation of the 
day, namely Ireland being under British rule. The turbulent political environment of the early 
1900s would have a seismic impact on the profession, and would greatly delay the growth of 
economists’ authority in Ireland. 
  




 3.2 The development of the Academic Order of economics in independent Ireland  
 
Prior to the establishment of the Irish Free State, many of the dominant elite institutions in 
Ireland, such as TCD, SSISI, and the RIA, tend to be loyalist to the British state of the United 
Kindom (UK), then of Britain and Ireland, rather to any Irish nationalist political tendencies  
(Bourke 1986; Walsh 2014). This loyalism allowed these institutions to reinforce their 
influence in Irish society, and so TCD and SSISI dominated the fledgling Irish economics 
profession. However, after the emergence of the Irish Free State, these loyalist leanings would 
become highly problematic. Although the Free State was keen to maintain some continuity 
with the previous British regime, evident in the largely continued employment of civil servants 
(O’Rourke and Hogan, 2017), it was also decidedly nationalist. This would lead to significant 
The Academic Order of Economics
Whately Chair at 
TCD
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turmoil on the institutions that helped form the economics profession and an altering of its 
evolution trajectory.  
  
The dominance of TCD started to be challenged by the emergence of Ireland’s own national 
institutions, and by prominent nationalist figures. For example, Eoin MacNeill1 argued that 
TCD maintained an unsympathetic attitude towards nationalistic issues, such as the Irish 
language, within the field of education (Walsh 2014:135). The founding of UCD in the1880s 
(O’Rahilly 1962) was the most direct challenge to TCD’s dominance. Although, it was 
originally considered to affiliate UCD with TCD, the Catholic hierarchy opposed  this,  given 
what it saw as the hostile position that TCD had to the Catholic Church,  and  UCD affiliated 
with the Royal University instead (Walsh 2014:136). This affiliation with the Royal University 
rather than with TCD caused a divergence between these two institutions, with TCD 
representing the Protestant establishment and maintaining strong links with the UK, and UCD 
representing the nationalist cause. This led to the swift erosion of the dominance that TCD once 
held within Irish academia, and would lead to its isolation from most parts of contemporary 
Irish society throughout the 1920s (Brown 2004:103–4).  
 
Although the isolation of TCD may have been initially caused by its loyalist history, it 
continued because of TCD’s persistent affiliation with the Protestant ascendency (Brown 2004; 
Ferriter, 2004: 354). Other historically loyalist institutes experienced a similar challenge to 
their prominent societal position, although their response would typically differ from the 
persistent loyalism of TCD. The RIA has long held a privileged position within the circles of 
the Irish intelligentsia, and had long had a close relationship with TCD, with many TCD 
professors being members of the RIA. Just prior to the founding of the Irish Free State, the 
council of the RIA was dominated by either graduates or academic staff of TCD.  Although 
there were nationalist members of the RIA council at the time, these were a small minority. 
The RIA’s loyalism was illustrated by its expulsion of Eoin MacNeill for his part in 1916 
rebellion against British rule (Bourke, 1986). Its loyalist allegiance was recognised and fostered 
in London, who provided the Academy with a grant of £1,600 per year up until the end of 
British rule in Ireland (Bourke 1986:198). These loyalist tendencies had allowed the RIA to 
                                                 
1 Eoin MacNeill was a prominent Irish nationalist, who was at the forefront of the Gaelic revival during this 
period, and was be an active member in Ireland’s struggle for independence. MacNeill was also a professor of 
early Irish history in UCD (Martin 1961). 
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grow in prominence prior to the founding of the Irish Free State. With the establishment of 
independence and following some turmoil, the RIA changed its attitude towards nationalism, 
specifically redefining itself as a national institution (Bourke 1986:202). This swift change in 
embracing the nationalist cause had some immediate effect. In 1922 the new Free State 
government informed the RIA that it would continue the annual grant that it had previously 
received from London (Bourke 1986:203). This decision from the Free State government 
contrasted with its relationship with TCD, to whom it did not provide monetary support. It 
appears to indicate that the Free State government sought to maintain continuity of the elite 
institutions in Ireland, on the prerequisite that they embrace the nationalist cause. 
 
 
The nationalist revolution in Ireland during the 1910s and 1920s significantly changed the 
Academic Order for the fledgling economics profession. TCD’s isolation would also be 
reflected within the economics profession. Charles Bastable, Whately Chair Professor in TCD 
and perhaps the preeminent economist in Ireland at the founding of the Free State, was a 
peripheral figure in the early economic committees set up by the Free State, a position which 
contrasted sharply with UCD economist George O’Brien, who was very prominent in these 
committees.   
 





The Order of Learning
Whately Chair at 
TCD
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4. The Political Order 
4.1 Economics and the Political Order in newly independent Ireland 
 
Ireland acquired independence and full fiscal autonomy from the UK (UK) in December 
1921 (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:9). The early Free State governments were dominated by Cumann na nGaedhael (CnG), who proudly branded themselves as ‘the most conservative minded revolutionaries that ever put through a successful revolution’ (Lee 1989:105). This conservatism permeated through CnG’s economic policy, and enabled a continuity of economic perspectives from British rule (O’Rourke and Hogan, 2017). They adopted a stringent policy of fiscal rectitude with regards the state finances in an attempt to be considered fiscally competent (Brown 2004:5). The Department of Finance strongly supported this economic policy, which was perhaps not surprising given that its first Secretary, Joseph Brennan, and Assistant Secretary, J. J. McElligott, were both renowned as ardent adherents to fiscal rectitude (Lee 1989:106). This staunch fiscal conservatism within the Irish Political Order lead to a focus on rigorous retrenchment of the Irish state, typified both in the cost of the civil service itself, which fell from a cost of £4.2 million to run in 1922, to £3.9 million in 1932 (this occurred even with an increase in employee numbers from 21,000 to 23,396), and the level of government expenditure, which was reduced from £42 million in 1923-4, to £32 million in 1924-5, to £24 million in 1926-7 (Lee 1989:108–9).  
 
Despite the economic apparatus of the State remaining largely the same after independence, 
the State still needed to formalise its economic mechanisms as questions regarding policies 
towards international trade, protection, and a national currency would soon become pressing. 
Given the relative dearth of economics expertise in the CnG government, the broad sweep of 
economic policy was determined by commissions of experts - namely, the Fiscal Inquiry 
Committee (1923), the Tariff Commission (1926), The Banking Commission (1926), and the 
Currency Commission (1927) (Daly 1992:16). The remit of these commissions was generally 
to advise on the direction of economic policy and the structure of Ireland’s economic apparatus, 
and we will examine the Fiscal Inquiry Committee and the Banking Commission in more depth 
here. 
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Figure.4: Original members of the Fiscal Inquiry Committee in 1923 
 
Fiscal Inquiry Committee 
Name Affiliated University Position 
Timothy Smiddy (chair) University College Cork Professor of Economics and 
Commerce 
R. M. Henry Queen’s University Belfast Professor of Latin -Vocal 
supportor of Irish 
nationalism and Irish 
language and culture 
(Devlin n.d.) 
J. G. Smith University of Birmingham Professor of Economics 
Charles Bastable Trinity College Dublin Whately Chair Professor of 
Political Economy 
George O’Brien University College Dublin Chair of National 
Economics 
 
Sources : Barry and Daly (2011); Lee (1989)  
In one of the government’s first decisions regarding economic policy, it set up a Fiscal Inquiry 
Committee in 1923 to investigate the existing fiscal system and recommend any changes with 
regard economic policy (Geary 1951:404). This Committee would influence fiscal policy in its 
resistance of protectionism and bias in favour of free trade in its economic outlook (O’Brien 
1962:14–15).  
The Fiscal Inquiry Committee (see Figure 4 above for its members and their affliations) was 
dominated by Bastable, who was a keen adherent of the classical liberal position which viewed 
free trade ‘as a religion rather than a policy’ (Meenan 1980:128). This would serve as a rare 
instance of TCD personnel gaining authority within the early Free State. Indeed, it would be 
UCD’s George O’Brien who would become a dominant figure within Irish economics. 
O’Brien’s influence is something which can perhaps be traced back to his time as a student in 
UCD, where he shared an economics class with Patrick Hogan, who became Agriculture 
Minister; Kevin O’Higgins, who became Home Affairs Minister; and Patrick McGilligan, who 
became Minister for Industry and Commerce (Daly 1992:14). Indeed, the influence of UCD on 
the early Free State government was so significant it was considered ‘very nearly a College 
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government’ (Meenan 1974:22). This prominence of UCD in the interaction between the 
Political and Academic Orders is reflected in Feeney, Hogan and O’Rourke (2017) who found 
that a great dominance of UCD in Irish cabinets, meant that, at times, Irish cabinets were even 
more elitist in their higher education formation than the British ones.  
 
Given that Ireland’s external trade was almost completely dominated by the UK, the initial 
urgency of establishing an independent currency was not seen as pressing (Honohan 1997:43). 
However, by the mid-1920s, the currency situation was proving to be increasingly problematic 
(Kavanagh 1997:16). The Coinage Act of 1926 sought to address this by granting powers to 
the Irish Free State to issue its own currency, but to address the question of whether any changes 
in law were needed in relation to banking and note issuance, the Irish government set up the 
Banking Commission (Kelly 2003:91), which was chaired by Henry Parker Willis, Professor 
of Banking at Columbia University, New York (Kavanagh 1997:16). However, the broader 
membership of this commission (sse Figure 5) was curious in its absence of Irish economists. 
This reason for the absence of Irish economists may have been because this was deemed a 
finance issue rather than an economics issue. However, another reason was that the Free State 
government was pleasing the banks, by appointing its members rather economists,  given the 
financial assistance they were providing the state during its formative years (Daly 1992:15). 
This commission  recommended the introduction of a new unit of currency that would be fixed 
at par with the British pound, and the creation of a Currency Commission to administer the 
introduction of this new currency (Honohan 1997:42–43). Although the issue of creating a 
Central Bank was within the terms of reference of the Banking Commission, it decided a 
Central Bank was unnecessary (Kelly 2003:92). Instead, a Currency Commission was 
recommended, and subsequently created, to control and manage the new currency (Duncan 
1928a:267).  
 
Figure 5: Members of the Banking Commission, 1926 
Banking Commission (1926) 
Name Affiliation 
Professor Henry Parker Willis (chair) Columbia University 
J. J. McElligott Department of Finance 
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Senator Andrew Jameson Bank of Ireland 
J. H. O’Connell National Bank, Dublin 
F. J. Lillis Munster & Leinster Bank 
Lionel Smith Gordon Industrial Trust Company of Ireland 
C. A. B. Campion Commonwealth Bank of Australia (retired) 
R. K. L. Galloway Ulster Bank, Belfast 
 
Sources: Daly (1992); Honohan (1997); Kavanagh (1997); Kelly (2003)   
 
 
It can be seen that the early Irish governments were amenable to using economics experts to 
help formulate or support economic policy, something that was particularly evident through 
their inclusion on certain government formed commissions. This afforded economists the 
ability to influence public policy in a more direct and substantial way. Although the CnG 
government was disposed to a free market bias, O’Brien (1962: 13-4) argues that 
recommendations of the Fiscal Inquiry Committee, which were largely followed by the 
government, ensured that protectionism was less than what would have otherwise been the 
case. However, CnG recognised that a value in having economists on these commissions was 
their perceived impartiality in their decision-making, but it may also be the case that CnG knew 
of the predisposition that the economists had, and selected them to legitimise an outcome they 
had already desired. It would be facetious to suggest that these commissions had no influence 
on government policy, and they did clearly allow economists to become more involved in the 
broader economic discourse, but it would appear that their influence was still somewhat 
limited.   
 
4.2 Hibernation: Economics and the Irish Political Order in 1930-1950s 
 
The rise in unemployment in the early 1930s put pressure on the new Irish state’s free  trade 
policy. The earliest protectionist policies from the CnG government were generally perceived 
as reactionary, rather than from any ideological persuasion (Barry and Daly 2011:1).  The 
Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, Gordon Campbell,  did advocate a 
protectionist policy to encourage industrial development (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:10). 
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Campbell was initially fiscally conservative in his economic outlook, but later embraced a more 
interventionist outlook with much more vigour than other prominent civil servants, such as 
Brennan or McElligott (Lee 1989:121). However, Campbell would remain an isolated voice in 
the civil service, and it would not be until Fianna Fáil (FF) were elected to government in 1932 
that protectionism would gain significant traction in government policy (Bielenberg and Ryan 
2013:10). 
 
The arrival of  (FF) to government office would result in a seismic shift in Irish economic 
policy as they brought with them, at least from 1932-1948, an ideological commitment to 
protectionism and a preference for economic self-sufficiency as the goal of policy (Barry and 
Daly 2011).. FF’s commitment to protectionism was evident almost immediately, with 
Ireland’s average tariff level rising from 9 percent in 1931 to 45 percent in 1936 (Cullen 
1987:178).The Irish Free State moved from ‘one of the least to one of the most protected 
economies ’ (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:14). The first budget of this FF government has been 
described as ‘unashamedly redistributive’ (Barry and Daly 2011:11) with expansionary fiscal 
policy at its core (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:14). Seán MacEntee, thenMinister for Finance, 
would later describe it as the first ‘Keynesian budget in this island’ (Barry and Daly 2011:11). 
This budget imposed 43 new duties and stoked the 'economic war' that was erupting between 
the UK due to a dispute over the payment of land annuities (Cullen 1987:178). Alongside these 
new tariffs, MacEntee also advocated for the development of protected industries to create jobs 
and reduce the persistent unemployment (Barry and Daly 2011:11). Hence, the economic 
nationalism of FF would comprise of both protectionism and the establishment of semi-state 
bodies, the latter of which would see the establishment of further state owned companies, such 
as The Irish Sugar Company, Aer Lingus, the Irish Tourist Board, Irish Life Assurance Board, 
Chemici Teo (producing industrial alcohol) and the Irish Turf Board all being set up in the 
1930s (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:14).  
 
In 1934, another Banking Commission was set up with a broad mandate to consider ‘every 
aspect of the Irish economic system’ (O’Brien 1962:15). Amongst the members of this 
commission was Per Jacobsson, a Swedish economist who was an economic advisor for the 
Bank of International Settlements. The attractiveness in including a prominent international 
economist appears to have been that they were looked upon with reverence by the government 
(Fanning 1983:150), a stark contrast to how Irish economists were perceived at the time. A key 
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recommendation the commission would make was that a national Central Bank was needed, 
which the FF government then established in 1942 (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:9). Given their 
interventionist and authoritative economic policy, it may seem curious that the government 
would create an independent Central Bank. However, the reason for it may lie in its economic 
nationalism, as prior to its inception, the Bank of England served as a quasi-Central Bank for 
Ireland; the Irish pound was linked to sterling and the Gold Standard at the time, even though 
Ireland held no reserves of gold. The Irish currency was instead backed by sterling assets 
(Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:10). An Irish Central Bank would at least break this reliance on the 
Bank of England. However, any suggestions that the Irish Central Bank would be overly 
influenced by the government were quickly dismissed as the Central Bank would immediately 
demonstrate its independence by being, openly critical of the economic policy of the 
government (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:16). Both academic economists and senior economic 
figures in the civil service shared this disapproval of the new policy direction (Barry and Daly 
2011:2). 
 
Irish  academic economists, such as George Duncan (Murphy 2006:73), who became occupant 
of the Whately Chair in 1934, and George O’Brien, Chair of National Economics in UCD 
(Barry and Daly 2011:4) opposed protectionism (Fanning 1983:141). Duncan was a keen 
student of the Austrian school of economics (Barry and Daly 2011:2), and became an early 
member of the Mont Pelerin Society (Murphy 2006:71).O’Brien spoke favourably about free 
enterprise and scorned interference from government in his review of a book on the Great 
Depression (Barry and Daly 2011:4), and demonstrated his liberal credentials with his paper 
on 'Monetary policy and the depression', which argued that government intervention or 'easy 
money' were not a panacea for economic ills (Fanning 1983:141). He was also critical of rising 
public expenditure during the 1940s, and its impact on Ireland’s balance of payments. As a 
member of Ireland’s Upper House of Parliament at this time, O’Brien spoke of the seriousness 
of the growing deficit in Ireland’s balance of payments, and how it required immediate public 
attention (O’Grada 1997:68). Another prominent economist of the day, Joseph Johnston of 
TCD, spoke of the frailties of government policy in the aftermath of the Great Depression and 
how governments needed to let the price mechanism operate unhindered (Barry and Daly 
2011:5). Johnson would fully voice his hostility towards protectionism in his 1934 book ‘The 
nemesis of economic nationalism’ (Fanning 1983:141).  
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Despite this vocal opposition from Irish economists to the  policies being adopted by FF, their 
concerns were largely ignored by the political establishment in their economic policy making 
(Brownlow 2010:313). Some have laid at least part of the blame for this treatment at the 
profession itself, suggesting that university economists were 'sulking in their tents' and still 
grasping to pre-Keynesian ideas which had been replaced by Keynesianism as the orthodox 
economics ideas internationally (Fanning 1983:154–55). It would appear that that divergence 
between Irish policy makers and Irish economists would the delay in the formalisation of the 
profession in Ireland. Even when the state sought to involve the profession in some economic 
policy making, such as through various commissions, it tended to load the members with 
individuals disposed to the nationalistic preference, and curtailed the input of the native 
economists in the economic institutions that were being formed, such as the Irish Central Bank.   
 
3.3 Awakenings: Irish Economics and the Irish Political Order from 1955 
 
In the 1950s, the Irish economy struggled and growth became elusive. Emigration was 
stubbornly high and persistent, and subsistence agriculture still accounted for a large majority 
of its economic activity (Honohan and Walsh 2002:3). Coupled with this was the persistence 
of government policy with protectionist ideals. However, the watershed moment for 
protectionism would arrive in 1955. The UK government increased interest rates in an attempt 
to quell inflationary pressures in its economy. In response, the Minister for Finance, Gerard 
Sweetman, decided to break the interest link between Ireland and the UK, a link that had been 
maintained since independence. What ensued was capital flight from Ireland to the UK to avail 
of the higher interest rate (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:19). A swift reversal of this experiment 
followed but the damage had been done. By 1956, this defining event had a significant impact 
on the Irish economy, evident in a deflationary budget, import levies, and emigration (Honohan 
and O’Gráda 1998), and highlighted the limitations of protectionism and a realisation that the 
home market was too small to expand the industrial base beyond meagre limits (Cullen 
1987:183). This crisis also appears to have been the catalyst for the reorientation of Irish 
economic policy that was soon to come (Bielenberg and Ryan 2013:19).  
 
In 1956, Sweetman was tasked with finding a replacement for Owen Redmond as Secretary at 
the Department of Finance. Redmond had replaced the long serving J. J. McElligott in 1953, 
and tradition suggested that a senior civil servant, with substantial experience in the service 
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should replace Redmond. However, Sweetman opted instead to appoint a relatively young civil 
servant, T K Whitaker as Secretary (O’Grada 1997:69). This change in personnel would usher 
in a seismic shift of Irish economic policy, moving away from the protectionism, which had 
dominated for the previous two decades, and replacing this with a policy that would advocate 
economic planning and orientate the Irish economy towards exports. Whilst Whitaker would 
demonstrate a less severe devotion to fiscal rectitude (O’Grada 1997:69), he would also argue 
that policy making at the department should be informed by expert research. The arrival of 
Whitaker as Secretary of the department would have far reaching consequences for the 
economics profession in Ireland.  
 
Whitaker was a keen student of economics, and attained a master’s degree in economics, while 
working at the department. He published in academic journals (e.g. Whitaker 1974) regularly 
presented papers at SSISI (Research Interviews, 2017). This also allowed him to become 
familiar with prominent economists in Ireland of the day, given how SSISI functioned as a 
proxy for an economics association at this time (Research Interviews, 2017). 
 Whitaker’s was not an uncritical supporter of Irish economics as his choice of the University 
of London, rather than an Irish university, to do his Masters indicates. He pushed for a more 
statistics to be integrated into economics in the universities and even went as far to forward his 
own suggested syllabus (Chambers, 2015: 65-66). Yet despite this critical approach Whitaker 
engaged the Irish economics profession. Indeed, Whitaker would acquire such standing in 
economics in Ireland that he would be referred to as an economist as well as a public servant 
in Irish societal discourse (RTÉ, 2017). 
 
In 1956, Whitaker formed the Capital Investment Advisory Committee, which had three 
economic advisors appointed to it, Professors Louden Ryan, Charles Carter and Paddy Lynch. 
Louden Ryan was Professor of Industrial Economics in TCD at this time, and he would become 
Whately Chair Professor. Charles Carter had been Professor of Applied Economics at Queen’s 
University, Belfast from 1952-1959, during which time he had developed a lasting interest in 
Ireland. Carter would go on to hold the Stanley Jevons chair of Political Economy at 
Manchester University, before becoming the founding vice chancellor of the University of 
Lancaster (McClintock 2002). Paddy Lynch was Professor of Political Economy at UCD, and 
would become a well renowned economist both nationally and internationally (De Buitlear 
2003:13–14)  
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The growing influence of the profession on public policy can be seen through its growing 
influence on the different Economic Development plans or programs. The first Programme was 
largely driven by Whitaker, and senior officials in the civil service. The second Programme 
would be for all intents and purposes the work of TCD’s Professor Louden Ryan and was also 
the main figure in the ‘neo-corporatist National Economic and Social Council’ (O’Grada 
1997:76). Economic Development would serve as an exemplar of how government policy and 
the orthodox thinking of the economics profession were beginning to coalesce, and how, 
through their advice to Whitaker, the profession was growing in influence on policy formation. 
 
The necessity for high class economic research in Irish public policy was further crystalised 
during the development of Economic Development. Although good data was available from the 
Central Statistics Office (CSO), there was a need for cutting edge, advanced econometrics 
analysis to inform policy. This led Whitaker to establish the ERI, which would later become 
the Economics and Social Research Institute ESRI, in 1960. With funding from the Ford 
Foundation, which Whitaker was able to secure, the ERI was given a mandate to provide 
research which could support economic policy making in Ireland. The ERI would facilitate the 
high quality, economic analysis that Whitaker saw as an essential element of the policies he 
wanted to develop at the department. This heightened demand for high quality economics in 
Ireland was complemented by an evident trend in the supply of economists.  
 
The 1960s saw a trend of young Irish graduates of economics going abroad to complete their 
PhD studies (Research Interviews, 2017). A number of these individuals would come back, 
fully trained in the frontiers of economic analysis, such as econometrics, and take up prominent 
positions in academia and public policy. These developments would further the legitimacy of 
the profession as its leading figures possessed the credentials and training from some of leading 
academic institutions. This international experience also reinforced the orthodox thinking of 
the profession towards the Whitaker approach of pro foreign investment, pro free trade, and 
critical of government intervention (Research Interviews, 2017).  
 
This period can be viewed as the watershed moment for the profession, as the change in 
economic policy and direction evident in the 1950s and 1960s in Ireland coincided as the 
emergence of the profession to a position of authority and legitimacy within society. However, 
this coronation of the economics profession by the Political Order does not mean that 
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governmental institutions necessarily followed the advice of the profession in all instances or 
without question. After the 1976 election, not only did an economics academic become the 
Minister of Economic Planning and Development but much of the critique of that Minister’s 
fiscal expansion policy was provided by   the Irish economics profession.  5. The Irish Economics Profession growth in strength from the 1980s 
 
Although SSISI had long served as a quasi-professional association, the lack of a dedicated 
economics association prior to the late 1970s, meant that the profession was still, in many ways, 
a collection of individuals, rather than a coherent group. Its meagre size had perhaps negated 
the urgency for a formalised professional body. From the 1970s, the profession would change 
from being a small, academic grouping, to being a larger grouping, with economists being 
employed in other public sector institutions, such as the Central Bank, and private sector 
institutions, such as stockbrokers and banks. This led to a need for some grouping to allow for 
a cohesive discussion amongst the profession and to reflect its growing diversity. The Dublin 
Economic Workshop, formed in 1977, would initially facilitate this, but it would not be until 
the formation of the Irish Economics Association (IEA) in 1986 that a fully dedicated 
professional body was established. However, like other economics professional bodies 
internationally, the IEA does not represent the profession in the same way that professional 
bodies in other disciplinary areas do. For example, the IEA, as an institution, would not release 
press statements on behalf of the profession. This has meant that although there is greater 
cohesion within the profession, and perhaps an increasing consensus around its orthodox 
position on economic policy, the profession is dominated by a small grouping of its most 
prominent members. These prominent members tend to have senior positions in elite academic 
institutes or senior positions in state institutes. These elites tend to act as the voice of the 
profession in the absence of a more traditional professional body. 
 
The international orientation of the economics profession in Ireland, from their disposition 
towards free trade to the training many had received internationally, lead it ‘to borrow heavily 
from contemporary thinking in the United States and the United Kingdom’ (O’Malley 
1986:479), which in 1980s were becoming less Keynesian and more neoliberal (Centeno and 
Cohen, 2012). O’Rourke and Hogan (2017) argue that the preservation of elements of pre-
Keynesian economic orthodoxy in Irish society from the days of British rule also meant that 
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Ireland was particularly fertile ground for neoliberalism as was the openness of the economy 
itself.   
 
1987 appears to be a pivotal moment in Ireland’s economic history, with the turnaround in 
economic performance being referred to as a ‘miracle’ (Honohan and Walsh 2002:1). Given 
the dire state of Ireland’s economy in the early 1980s (Honohan 1992), inflation was more than 
20%, the current account deficit was 15% of GNP, and unemployment was 16% by 1986 
(Honohan and Walsh  2002:8), economists were increasingly in demand from Irish media and 
society to help explain the economic performance and, implicitly, to offer some direction for 
future economic policy (Pratschke 1985:145). This lead to a steady increase in influence of 
economists in Irish public discourse as the profession continued to broaden and reinforce its 
social closure. Economists used this influence largely to criticise government policy  (Pratschke 
1985:145). In keeping with the changing orthodoxy within the profession internationally 
towards fiscal retrenchment ‘to correct swollen budgets and external deficits’, the profession 
in Ireland were advocating similar remedies to ease the fiscal woes (Honohan 1992).  
In 1987, the incoming government recognised the dire condition of the economy, and 
implemented a severe fiscal contraction in the public finances to rectify the fiscal position of 
the economy (Barry 1991), a policy that the profession had been advocating, and one which 
was facilitated through political consensus between the government and the main opposition 
party (MacSharry, White, and Kennedy 2000). Further facilitating this fiscal rectitude was the 
social partnership agreement agreed between government and trade unions, which allowed for 
wage moderation in return for promises of future tax reductions (Barry and FitzGerald 2001). 
Economists were advocating similar fiscal rectitude policies on the media frequently during 
this period (e.g. Barrett 1985), though the  adopted government policy may also have occurred 
in the absence of the profession given the severity of the economic situation (Research 
Interviews, 2017). 
However, given the regular commentary from the profession on the media it would seem 
difficult to argue that the profession had no impact on the economic policy that came as a result 
of the Tallaght Strategy.  
  6 The Business Order in a Celtic Tiger 1987-2007 
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The economic growth that the Irish economy experienced from 1987 to 2007 was remarkable. 
It transformed the Irish economy, with the number of people in employment rising from 1.1 
million to 1.9 million in the 15 years until 2005, and its population increasing by 15 percent 
from 1996 to 2005 (Dorgan 2006). Although there were some cautionary notes about how long 
the ‘Celtic Tiger’ period could last, this period of rapid economic development was broadly 
lauded (Breathnach 1998).  
 
However, by 2000, Ireland’s economic growth was being driven by domestic demand, 
particularly the property market, and not exports. This led to some concerns being voiced about 
the government’s economic policy, because it was expansionary and pro-cyclical (European 
Commission 2001:141–44; IMF 2001:19–20). Also raising concern among Irish academic and 
research economists (including, Duffy, 2002: Roche, 1999) was the rapid appreciation of asset 
prices being witnessed in the Irish property market, which not escape international attention 
either (IMF 2003, 2004; European Commission, 2006; 269). Such reservations about 
expansionary policies and house prices were echoed by many members of the economics 
profession in Ireland, particularly those in academic and research institutions (including Barry 
& FitzGerald, 2001; Central Bank of Ireland 2004, 2005, 2006; Honohan, 2006), if not those 
working for commercial organizations. However, such concerns from the profession were 
largely ignored by government, as they were similarly ignored in the early 1980s. The question 
of how explicit any warnings from economists should be is difficult to be definitive about, 
given that different audiences may have consumed its contents in different ways. For example, 
the profession may have understood its recognition of issues in the housing market as an alert, 
given their level of technical expertise and shared discourse (Maesse 2015), but the media or 
broader society may not have been able to recognise such subtleties.  
 
Warnings from the economics profession were often met with derision from the political order. 
Charlie McCreevy, Minister for Finance from 1997-2004, mocked economists who warned 
against the government’s fiscal policies (O’Rourke and Hogan 2013:218), claiming ‘when I 
have money I spend it; when I don’t, I don’t’ (Barry 2010:38). Bertie Ahearn, who was 
Taoiseach2 from 1997-2008, made perhaps the most memorable such derision, when he 
wondered how those who criticise the economy did not ‘commit suicide’ (RTÉ 2007). Such 
                                                 
2 Irish Prime Minister 
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comments can be seen as indicative of a broader marginalising of any criticism of the economy 
(Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010:16). However, given their widespread reception, they may have 
also allowed the Irish Economists to escape the stern criticism that the global profession 
experienced for a perceived lack of forewarning about the Great Recession (Colander et al. 
2009). 
 7. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
This paper has explored how the authority of Economics Expertise in Ireland was formed 
through  ‘Orders’, outlined in the theoretical framework. The initial Academic Order was 
strongly influenced by British institutions, something that was most clearly identifiable with 
the Whately Chair in TCD. The emergence of the Irish Free State would begin to alter this 
dominance within the Order of Learning, and would see the Political Order become a pivotal 
influence on the Academic Order, ushering in a more national orientation on the work of the 
profession. TCD would lose its dominant position within the Academic Order of economics in 
Ireland, and be replaced by UCD as the dominant academic institute. By the 1960s, the 
Academic Order was again beginning to change, this time towards an international orientation. 
This was initiated by the decision of a number of prominent, Irish economics graduates to go 
abroad to complete their PhD studies. Upon their return, many of these would occupy 
prominent positions within Irish academia and would be trained in the frontiers of the 
profession. The majority of those who went abroad, opted for either the UK or the USA as their 
preferred destination, with an emphasis on the latter. This would see a gradual shift away from 
economic planning as a dominant ideology, and back towards a free-market ideological 
preference.  As regard the Political Order, from the early 1930s to the mid-1950s, barring some 
fleeting exceptions the profession was largely kept out of public policy. This would change 
significantly in the 1950s with the appointment of T. K. Whitaker as Secretary of the 
Department of Finance, and his advocacy of research and in particular economics informed 
policy. Whitaker would swiftly appoint prominent members of the profession as policy 
advisors and would allow the profession to have significant influence on policy.  
 
The level of authority that the profession possesses has not been constant since its 
formalisation. The profession appears to be at the height of its authority during periods of 
economic malaise or crisis. It is unclear as to whether the adoption of either Economic 
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Development or the Tallaght Strategy were as a direct result of the profession, but in both cases 
the position of the profession was certainly known. Once the orthodox policies were adopted 
in both instances, the Irish economy experienced a significant and prolonged period of 
economic expansion. This appears to have led to these two policies as being singled out as 
pivotal in the economic development of Ireland. However, what can also be seen from this 
historical account is that as the period of malaise or crisis wanes, the authority of the profession 
also wanes. This is not to suggest that they lose their authority, but to say that the authority is 
less than it was during the height of the crisis period. The ignoring of criticism from the 
profession in both the early 1980s and the early 2000s of economic policy is indicative of this. 
This pattern is once again observable in the Great Recession. As the global economic situation 
started to deteriorate, followed by the Irish economic situation in late 2008, the authority of the 
profession was once again heightened.   
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